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FURTHER 

AND 

STILL MORE IMPORTANT SUPPRESSED 



DOCUMENTS. 



PREFACE. 



THE right which every Government possesses to keeji secret 
its intercourse and negotiations with foreign nations, so long at 
least as they are still pending, has been most grossly abused by 
the present Administration. 

Availing themselves of the privilege of secret debate, and of 
the right to impose injunctions of secrecy on the members of the 
two houses, they have published just so much, and no more, of 
the Correspondence of our Government with foreign powers, as 
would subserve their own views, as would tend to palliate the 
conduct of France, and exasperate the People against Great 
Britain. 

It will be perceived by the Documents which we are now about 
to publish, the authenticity of which may be relied on, and which 
we challenge Mr. Madison to disavow if he dare, that while the 
most important facts in the treatment of France to us, and the 
most interesting opi7tions of Gen. Armstrong, tending to shew the 
necessity of a war, or of spirited measures against that nation, 
have been purposely kept back, letters from Mr. Pinckney on the 
other hand, favourable to Great Britain, and to her ticws and 
feelings, have been equally suppressed. 

It will be seen, that as the Government professed to take hos- 
tile ground equally against both, no honourable motives of policy 
or prudence, no rules of diplomatic delicacy required th* sufipret' 
sion of tliese letters. 



IV 

■H'c arc happy in being able to give them to the public. We 
xhall fdace them, in order of time, and accompany them with such 
explanatory remarks only, as are absolutely necessary to the right 
understanding of such mutilated extracts. The other parts of 
the same correspondence will be found by our readers among the 
documents published by order of the Senate early in the present 
se8sioj/. 



FURTHER 



SUPPRESSED DOCUMENTS. 



THE first Document which we present to the public is an ex- 
tract of a letter from Mr Armstrong to Mr. Madison, dated 
Dec. 27, 1807, in which our Minister declares, that every 
man in France agrees, that the Decrees of the Emperor are 
impolitic ; but that no man had the hardihood to state this 
opinion to the Emperor. It results from this correspondence 
that so great are the apprehensions entertained of the vio- 
lence of the temper of this tyrant, that we have no means 
of communicating to him the sense we have of his injustice. 
As his own ministers dare not express their own convictions, 
and as the rules of diplomatic forms forbid a direct applica- 
tion to him, we are obliged to submit to all his caprices, with- 
out the possibility of remedy. This may be an apology in 
the minds of the admirers and advocates of this despot, but 
it proves our case to be hopeless. 



Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison, 

Paris, dec 27, 1807. 

« I FORWARDED to Mr. McElhony a Copy of a second 
and very extraordinary Decree* of this Government with re- 
gard to neutral commerce. Whether it be meant to stimulate 
Great Britain to the commission of new outrages, or to quicken 
us in repelling those she has already committed — the policy is 
equally unwise, and so decidedly so, that I know not a man of 
consideration who approves of it. It is however not less true, 
that it is as difficult to find one who will hazard an objection to it. 

T c ] ? w ho in this way is permitted to go further than 

any other person, dare not avow his opinion of it, nor (bad as 
he thinks it) do more than state that the present moment would 

* The Milan Decree of Dec. 17th. 



appear to dictate some modifications. To this point he stands 
engaged to go, and I wait the result with much anxiety. The 
Emperor is expected here on the last day of the month." 



THE second suppressed Document is a part of the letter of 
Mr. Madison of the 8th of Feb. 1808, to Mr. Armstrong. 
The letter was published as a perfect whole. No reference 
whatever was made to any suppressed extract, nor was it in- 
timated that any part had been suppressed. 

The part now added originally followed the sentiment, ex* 
pressed by Mr. Madison, that his Britannic Majesty had de-> 
clared, " that he would repeal or relinquish his Orders pari 
passu (with equal pace) with his enemy, France." Mr. Madi- 
son, in the su/i/iressed extract, now first laid before the pub- 
lic, adds, that he presumes the British Government did not 
contemplate the distinction between that part of the French 
Decrees which operated on land and that part which operated 
at nea. And the inference is, that Great Britain would not 
admit the absurd and disgraceful distinction set up by our 
Government, that the French Decrees so Jar as they affected 
our trade in their ports were lawful, but so far as they affect- 
ed our trade on the ocean were unjust : and Mr. Madison 
concludes with urging a modification only of the French De- 
crees so far as respects the seizure in their ports, and urges 
it on the ground, not of our rights secured by treaty, but on 
the effect it would have on the objects of France. That these 
objects, the destruction of British commerce, would be as ef- 
fectually promoted by annihilating our treaty and confining 
her seizures to her own ports and those of her dependencies 
as by captures on the ocean. The late report of a relaxation 
of the Miian decree seems to he founded on this treacherous 
concession of Mr. Madison, and probably was produced by 
the mean councils of our cabinet. 



Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong. 

FEBRUARY 8, 1808 

£To follow the paragraph ending with the words " pari passu with 
his enemy. "3 

" WHETHER these intimations have any reference to the 
distinction between such parts of the French Decree as operate 
municipally on shore, and such as operating on the high seas, 
violate the rights of neutrals, or to a distinction between the 
former restriction, and the late extension of the Decree with 



respect to the United States, Mr. Erskine did not seem autho- 
rised to say. The probability is, that neither of these distinc- 
tions entered into the views of the British Cabinet. But it is 
certainly neither less the duty nor the true policy of the Em- 
peror ot the French, so to vary his Decree, as to make it con- 
sistent with the rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas, 
and particularly with his positive stipulations with the United 
States. This may be the more reasonably expected, as nothing 
can be more clear, as has been already observed, than that the 
effect of the Decree, as far as it can be carried into effect, would 
not be sensibly diminished by abolishing its operation beyond 
the limits of the territorial sovereignty." 



THE next Documents in order of time are the suppressed let- 
ters of Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison of 22d Feb. 1808, 
and of the 9th March of the same year. 

The first, which in the pure periods of our history would have 
roused our nation to a flame, contained facts and allegations 
of the most important tendency, and proofs of a temper, to 
which no nation ever yet submitted before it was subdued ; 
we now give it to the public. 

It appears, that Bonaparte declared we should be either " al- 
lies or enemies ;" that the amount of property sequestered 
was upwards of one hundred millions of francs, or seventeen 
millions of dollars, nearly three times as great as the whole 
amount of British captures during the whole of fifteen years' 
war ; that our ambassador at Paris, who cannot be charged 
with too much spirit, declared, that the very magnitude of 
these sums, rendered all hope of redress abortive — and that 
he presumed as soon as we should know from him that 
France had thus definitively taken her ground, " we shovld 
iMMEDiAf ely take ours." In other words, that we should 
resist with our whole energies such flagrant insults and vio- 
lations of our rights. 

Yet this letter is suppressed — and it produced no sentiment of 
indignation in our submissive rulers. We did take our ground 
but it was the ground of base submission, of further humi- 
liation. 

The letter of the 9th of March, hereto subjoined, shews, that 
Bonaparte had stated, that he would modify his decrees, if 
we could point out a mode in which he could do it without de- 
parting from his system ; but Mr. Armstrong explicitly 
states, that he doubted the sincerity of this declaration. 

In fact he made a proposal for modification to which no reph 
has ever been given. 



Extract of a letter fi»om Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison. 

FEBRUARY 22, 1808. 

" MR. PATTERSON offering so good a conveyance that 
I cannot but employ it. Nothing has occurred here since the 
date of my public dispatches (the 17th) to give to our business 
an aspect more favourable than it then had ; but on the other 
hand, I have come to the knowledge of two facts, which I 
think sufficiently shew the decided character of the Emperor's 
policy with regard to us. These are, first, that in a Council of 
Administration held a few days past, when it was proposed to 
modify the operation of the Decrees of Nov. 1806, and Dec. 
1807, (though the proposition was supported by the whole 
weight of the Council,) he became highly indignant, and de- 
clared that these Decrees should suffer no change — and that the 
Americans should be compelled to take the positive character 
of either Allies or Enemies : 2d. That on the 27th of Jan. last, 
twelve days after Mr. Champagny's written assurances, that 
these Decrees should work no change in the property sequestered 
until our discussions with England were brought to a close, and 
seven days before he reported to me verbally these very assurances, 
the Emperor had by a special decision confiscated two of our 
ships and their cargoes (the Julius Henry, and Juniata) for 
want merely of a document not required by any law or usage of 
the commerce in which they had been engaged. This act was 
taken as I am informed on a general report of sequestei'ed cases, 
amounting to one hundred and sixty, and which, at present 
prices, will yield upwards of one hundred millio?is of francs, a 
sum whose magnitude alone renders hopeless all attempts at 
saving it. — Danes, Portuguese and Americans, will be the 
principal sufferers. If I am right in supposing that the Em- 
peror has definitively taken his ground, I cannot be wrong in 
concluding that you will immediately take yours" 



Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison. 

9th march, 1808. 

• l THE conversation alluded to in the copy of the letter 
did not take pkee till the 8th inst. when the Em- 



peror declared that if means could be found to make an excep- 
tion of the Nov. Decree, that such exception should have his 
consent." 



Extract from the same to the same. 

15th march, 1808. 

" I STATED in my last letter the substance of a declaration 
made by the Emperor, viz. that if means could be found to 



except American property from the operation of the Decree of 
Nov. 1806, without infringing the principles of the Decrees, 
he would immediately make the exception. No time was lost 
in communicating this declaration to me, and I was invited to 
point out the means it required, and assured that they should 
be immediately submitted to his Majesty. Little as 1 liked the 
proposition, and much as / doubted the sincerity of the declaration 
out of which it grew, I could not refuse any agency of mine in 
rescuing so much of the American property sequestered in the 
ports of France as should come within this new rule. I ac- 
cordingly wrote the Note (a copy of which is subjoined to this 
letter) pointing out in a few words the property to which that 
rule would apply. 1'his note was put into the Emperor's hand 
by the Prince of Benevento, who, though s,ix days have now 
©lapsed, has not yet received an answer." 



THE following Document from Mr. Madison to Mr. Arm* 
strong, proves that our Government were resolved to give up 
all claims for the unjust Decrees of France, so far as they 
operated on land: that Mr. Madison chose to overlook the 
captures in the West-Indies, stated in his own letter of May 
22d, 1807: that though Bonaparte had expressly avowed 
nine months before that his original plan was to extend the 
Decree of Berlin to American Commerce, Mr. Madison 
chose to consider the original plan confined to seizures in 
port ; and that all we wished was, that France should so mo- 
dify her decrees, as to cut us off from all trade with the 
Continent, provided they would permit us to navigate the 
ocean. This hint is said at last to have reached the Imperial 
ear, and that he has consented to modify, not his Berlin De- 
cree, but the Decree of Milan, which rendered a forcible 
boarding by a British cruiser cause of condemnation — Gene- 
rous Prince ! Thy bounty is equal to thy moderation ! No 
doubt Mr. Madison will thank the Emperor for this favour, 
and as before, defend the Berlin Decree as a just and lawful 
measure. 

For the Emperor's understanding of his Berlin Decree, and its 
original plan, see Armstrong's letter published in the docu- 
ments, page 20, in which he says, " that the application of 
that decree to us was the result of the general expressions of 
the article," and that the Emperor's decision, that il should 
apply to us, was the declaration of an anterior and positive 
disposition. 



10 

Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong. 

may 2, 1808. 

fTo follow the paragraph ending with the words " will be immediate- 
taken."] 

" THE repeal of her Decrees is the more to be expected, 
above all, if Great Britain should repeal, or be likely to repeal 
hers, as the plan of the original Decree at Berlin did not extend 
to a violation of the freedom of the seas, and was restricted to a 
municipal operation for nearly an entire year, notwithstanding 
the illegal British Order of Jan. 1807, and as a return of France 
to that restricted scope of her plan, would so immaterially di- 
minish its operation against the British commerce ; that ope- 
ration being sO completely in the power of France on land, and 
so little in her power on the high seas. But although we cannot, 
if right, demand of France more than a repeal of so much of her 
Decrees as violate the freedom of the seas, and a great point will 
be gained by a repeal of that part of them, yet as it may not 
have the effect of inducing a repeal of the whole illegal system 
of the British Government, which may seek pretexts, to plead 
a necessity for counteracting the unprecedented and formidable 
-mode of warfare practised against her ; it will be desirable, that 
as little room as possible should be left, for this remaining dan- 
ger to the tranquil enjoyment of our commercial rights. 



THE following frank, and open letter from Armstrong to 
Pinkney proves that all hopes of operating on France, either 
through her justice or wisdom, were wholly vain, and worse 
than vain, mischievous. 

He adds, that France has become convinced, " that words, and 
words only are the weapons we can employ." 

This is too severe from a friend — " And you Brutus — then die 
Caesar." Have the Federalists been unjust in ascribing this 
pompous boasting character to the Government, when its 
own officers dare tell it so ? Yet this officer still holds his 
place. 



Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Pinkney. 

Paris, 26th juke, 1808. 

" THE St. Michael arrived at L'Orient, on the first inst. 
and the government messenger at Paris on the 8th; a passport 
for the vessel to Falmouth, thence to L'Orient again, was im- 
mediately requested, but one in the form could not be granted 
but by order of the Emperor, and this was not given till the 



11 

18th ; these circumstances will account for the long detention 
of your dispatches. We have reason to regret that the views 
of our government, founded on the justice and wisdom of the 
belligerent powers, are so little likely to succeed. Attempts of 
this character made here (and they have not been unfrequentj 
have hitherto done no good. Nay, the repetition of these may 
be fairly presumed have done mischief, inasmuch as it has tend- 
ed to establish a creed, that words in some form or other, are 
the only means we have to employ. The French Council pf 
Prizes, which is (I am told) as like the English Court of 
Admiralty, as one egg is like another, has lately began a career 
of condemnation. Between the 1st and 15th inst. five cases 
have been decided, and I am assured that orders have been re- 
ceived from Bayonne, for condemning all American cases en 
bloc [in mass.] What has suspended the axe since the 15th, 
we can but conjecture. It may be presumed that the reflections 
of the Spanish Junta, on the political and other relations, sub- 
sisting between Spain and the United States, through the me- 
dium of the colonies, may have produced the pause. That it 
is not owing to any conquest which good principles have ob- 
tained over bad ones, is certain. Are things any better your 
side the channel ?" 



THE following letter from Gen. Armstrong proves his sense 
of the folly and inutility, the incompetency and fruitlessness 
of our Embargo. He recommends vigorous measures 
against France. The reasons he assigns, his conviction that 
we can do much against France, and the belief entertained 
by France that we dare not do any thing against her, while 
they prove, that France knew our rulers, and had pledges 
from them, of which he was ignorant, prove also a private 
good understanding with France, through some other channel 
than that of our accredited Minister. 



Extract of a letter from Mr. Aiinstrong to Mr. Madison. 

30th augiJst, 1808. 

WE have somewhat overrated our means of coercion, of 
the two great belligerents to a course of justice. The Embar- 
go is a measure calculated above any other, to keep us whole, 
and keep us in peace, but beyond this you must not count upon 
it. Here it is not felt, and in England (in the midst of the 
more recent and interesting events of the day) it is forgotten. 
I hope that unless France shall do us justice, we shall raise the 
Embargo, and make in its stead the experiment of an armed 
commerce. Should she adhere to her wicked and foolish 



12 

measures, we ought not to content ourselves with doing this. 
There is much, very much besides that we can do, and we 
ought not to omit doing all we can, because it is believed here, 
that we cannot do much, and even that we will not do what we 
have the power of doing. 



THE letter from Mr. Pinkney which we now present to our 
readers, fully establishes a truth which we have all of us 
well known, that Great Britain is earnestly desirous of a 
good understanding with us — that for the attainment of this 
object, she will sacrifice every thing but her honour and her 
essential rights. 

That as to the business of Tribute, which our Government 
and Members of Congress have shamefully made a subject 
of complaint, it arose solely from our own minister. He de~ 
dares that revenue was no object with the British Ministry ; 
that they offered to place the affair on the footing of the 
French Decrees, that is, an absolute firoliibition ; and that the 
course of imposing a duty was adopted as being more agree- 
able to us ; that they have offered to take it off if more agree- 
able to our Government, and that our Government and Mi- 
nister preferred to keep it on as a source of popular com- 
plaint. 

Mr. Pinkney declares, that the motives of the British Govern- 
ment would be acceptable to the President. 



Letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr, Madison. 

FEBRUARY 2, 1808. 

H SIR, I had an interview this morning with Mr. Canning, at 
his own request. One object of the interview related to the 
Message of the President, of the 27th of October last, of which 
a newspaper copy had been received from Mr. Erskine. A 
call for a copy of this message was expected in Parliament, and 
Mr. C. wished to be in a situation to produce it. I could not 
assist him, and I suppose the newspaper copy will be consider- 
ed sufficient. 

" As soon as this subject was disposed of, Mr. C. observed, 
that he had requested to see me principally for the purpose of 
conversing with me privately and extra-officially upon the duty 
proposed to be laid in consequence of their late blockading or- 
ders, upon cotton intended for re-exportation to enemy-ports 
upon the Continent. The very few occasional remarks which 
1 had made upon this subject at our last interview, (already men- 
tioned in my letter of the ult.)had led him to suppose that it 



13 

was only to this mode of excluding our cotton from France, 
that the United States would be likely to object. And if their 
object could be accomplished in another way, the measure 
would cease to be offensive. Having admitted (what indeed 
was sufficiently obvious before) that they looked to the intend- 
ed duty upon cotton as a complete prohibition — he said that if 
it would be more acceptable to the United States that the form 
of the proceeding should be changed, so as to leave the exclu- 
sion of cotton from the Continent to the mere effect of the 
blockade, their desire to consult the feelings and wishes, in 
whatever did not entirely counteract the great end of the mea- 
sure, would dispose them to adopt such a modification of their 
plan. In the course of his explanations upon this point, he in- 
troduced professions of good will towards our Country, of re- 
gret that France had imposed upon them the necessity of re- 
sorting to a step which might be supposed to press with seve- 
rity upon our interests, and of an anxious desire that a return to 
a system of equity and moderation on the part of her enemies, 
would speedily enable Great Britain to abandon (as she would 
in that case certainly do) the whole of the recent Orders itf 
Council. He stated that it was peculiarly important towards 
the first effect of the Orders, (of which it was the object to 
compel France to relieve the commerce of the world from the 
oppression of her late Decrees,) that considerable supplies of 
cotton should not be introduced into the Continent — that it had 
been hoped and believed, that the United States would not re- 
ceive harsh or Unfriendly, a constrained attempt by Great Bri- 
tain to prevent such supplies from being received by the other 
parties to the war, especially as it was certain that Great Britain, 
could herself consume the whole of the cotton which we were 
in the habit of sending abroad, and that they had preferred the 
imposition of a duty upon cotton to a direct prohibition through 
the operation of the blockade, because it was consistent with 
those various and extensive modifications of the blockade to 
which they had been led, not merely by views of advantage to 
themselves, but by respect for the convenience and feelings of 
other nations, and particularly of America. In fine, he wished 
to know my private opinion, before the subject came before the 
Parliament, whether an alteration in this respect from a pro- 
hibitory duty to an absolute interdict, would be likely to be ac- 
ceptable to us. I replied in as conciliatory a manner as I could, 
that as soon as I had understood that a duty was to be proposed 
on re-exported cotton, I had been disposed to take for granted 
that the object was not revenue but prohibition. 

" That whether the object were the one or the other, it wfcte 
as he knew, my opinion that the United States would hold that 
object as well as the means, and the -whole system connected 
with them, to be utterly inadmissible, and that I did not feel 
myself authorised to say, to which of the causes he had suggest- 



14 

ed, my Government would give the preference, or that it would 
feel any preference for either. Mr. C. at length asked me, if I 
should think it worth while to consult my Government on this 
subject, observing at the same time, that he would not wish it 
to be done if there was the least danger of giving offence, and as- 
suring me that what he had said, firoceededfrom motives the most 
amicable and respectful towards us. He added, that upon reflec- 
tion this would be the most convenient mode, as it would now 
give them a good deal of trouble to accommodate their plan, as 
prepared for Parliament, to a change of so much importance in 
season to be acted upon. 

" I answered in substance, (as I saw it was his wish,) that I 
could mention what had passed to you. And that I did not 
doubt, that the motives of his proposal, whatever might be 
thought of the proposal itself, would be acceptable to the Presi- 
dent. He requested me to say to you, that although the neces- 
sary bills would be proposed, and would pass in Parliament, ac- 
cording to their first project of a duty, yet that the alteration 
above suggested, would be adopted whenever it should be 
known that it would be agreeable to us. 

" I must not trouble you with any reflections upon this con- 
versation, but it is my duty to say, that although Mr. C.'s man- 
ner was extremely conciliatory, not a word escaped him to en- 
courage a hope, that the Orders in Councirwould be in any de- 
gree abandoned, or that I should gain any thing by urging a re- 
consideration of them. I threw out some intimations with that 
tendency, but soon perceived that it could not be useful to fol- 
low them up. I have the honor to be," Sec. 



THE following letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison is ex- 
ceedingly favourable as to the views of the British Cabinet, 
and their wishes to preserve a good understanding with the 
United States. 

Mr. Canning received our Embargo, it seems, with great appa^ 
rent satisfaction, and expressed the most friendly disposition 
towards the United States, and in the explanations which our 
minister asked of him in that interview, as to the doubtful 
parts of their Orders, Mr. Canning replied, " that it was their 
" sincere wish to shew in every thing connected with the Or- 
" ders in Council, which necessity only compelled them to 
" adopt, their anxiety to accommodate them to the feeling* 
" and interest of the American Government." 

Compare this with the contemptuous silence of Bonaparte, and 
Mr. Armstrong's declaration, that further solicitation would 
be injurious. 



15 

A letter from Mr. Pinkneij to Mr. Madison. 

LONDON, JANUARY 26th, 1808. 

" SIR — I had the honour to receive this morning your letter 
of the 23d of last month, inclosing a copy of a message from the 
President to Congress, and of their act in pursuance of it, laying 
an Embargo on our vessels and exports. It appeared to be my 
duty to lose no time in giving such explanations to the British 
Government, of this wise and salutary measurers your letter 
suggests. And accordingly I went to Downing-street imme- 
diately, and had a short conference with Mr. Canning, who re- 
ceived my explanations with great apparent satisfaction, and took 
occasion to express the most friendly disposition towards our 
country. I availed myself of this opportunity, to mention a 
subject of some importance, connected with the late Orders in 
Council. 

" I had been told, that American vessels coming into British 
ports under warning, could not obtain any document to enable 
them to return to the United States, in the event of its being- 
found imprudent, either to deposit their cargoes, or to resume 
their original voyages, although they are not prohibited from re- 
turning, yet as the warning is indorsed on their papers, the re- 
turn may be hazardous, without some British documents to 
prove compliance with it, and give security to the voyage. Mr. 
C. took a note of what I said, and assured me that whatever was 
necessary to give the facility in question, would be done without 
delay ; and he added, that it was their sincere wish to shew, in 
every thing connected with the Orders in Council, which only 
necessity had compelled them to adopt, their anxiety to accommo- 
date them, as far as was consistent with their object, to the feel- 
ings and interest of the American government and people. I 
was induced by these observations to mention and to make seve- 
ral strong remarks upon the duty intended to be imposed on our 
cotton when re-exported to the Continent, and the adherence to 
the determination not to allow our vessels warned into British 
ports, any change of destination. He told me that these sub- 
jects (with which, however, it was evident he was very little ac- 
quainted) should be taken into immediate consideration, and that 
he would let me know the result. I am to have another inter- 
view with him in the course of a few davs." 



THE letter from Mr. Pinkney, which we now present to our 
readers, is worthy of all their attention, and will excite the 
most serious and alarming reflections. 

It may be considered as the grand clue to all the conduct of our 
administration, during the important and interesting session 
which is now about to close. In order to understand cor- 



16, 

rcctly, and to weigh with judgment, tlic opinions of Mr. 
Pinkney, it may be useful to state his character, and his po- 
litical situation, as well as the particular motives, which influ- 
enced him to take the extraordinary and untenable ground, 
which he has assumed in this letter. 

Mr. Pinkney was originally a federalist, educated under the pa- 
tronage of Judge Chase, and first brought into notice under 
the administration of Washington. In the office of Commis- 
sioner under the British treaty, in which he acted in con- 
junction with Mr. Gore, he was so far from holding the opi- 
nions of the present administration, that he was rather oppo- 
sed to Mr. Gore and Col. Trumbull, on one of the most im- 
portant questions which came before the board ; the question 
of the Colonial Trade. Before the commission had been en- 
tirely fulfilled, Mr. Pinkney betrayed some strong symptoms 
of a change of politics, and, on his return to Maryland, he 
discovered such unequivocal marks of disaffection to his old 
friends and principles, that Mr. Jefferson was induced to no- 
minate him to his present important office. Any man who 
has noticed the course and conduct of political men, must 
have remarked, that ?iew converts always manifest a zeal, pro- 
portioned to the diffidence and distrust, which would, and 
which does naturally arise, with respect to those who sudden- 
ly change their political opinions. Our republic, though in 
its infancy, has exhibited many striking examples of this na- 
ture. 

In the course of the late interesting correspondence with Great 
Britain, the whole public and private conduct of Mr. Pinkney 
evinces a fixed determination to retain his place ; to humour 
and flatter the destructive whims and notions of the present 
Administration. 

In no instance has this spirit been more strikingly exhibited 
than in the following letter. 

Mr. Pinkney had learned that the unexpected and astonishing 
change in Portugal and Spain, had excited a great and ho- 
nourable sensibility in this country, and that our people, 
yielding to the influence of these generous feelings, which 
perfectly coincided not only with their own immediate in- 
terests but with the public welfare, were extremely urgent to 
have the intercourse with Portugal and Spain opened. 

Mr. Pinkney, reasoning rather like a French Minister, than an 
American Representative, with his eyes open only to the 
cfl'ec;s which such a proper and noble measure would have on 
1' ranee, rather than its operation on our own interests, or the 
dictates of generous sympathy, combats with great zeal the 
policy of opening our intercourse with these two gallant na- 
tions who were struggling for their freedom. 

The si nsTANCE, and indeed the only argument of weight ur- 
ged by him is the danger of a rupture with Prance. To avoid 



17 

this (in his mind) greatest calamity, we are to forego our own 
rights and advantages, we are to be cold towards these as- 
sertors of the rights of mankind, and we are to throw our- 
selves into the humble train of the vassals of France. 

Mr. Pinkney after stating that it would be more agreeable to 
France that we should take oft" the Embargo wholly, or even 
take it off as to Great Britain alone rather than remove it as 
to Spain and Portugal, proceeds to eulogise the Embargo at 
large, to prtdse the wisdom and energy of that measure, 
which all intelligent men have now abandoned. 

That Mr. Pinkney should be disposed to frame his letter so 
as to favour the views of the Administration, will not be 
surprising to any man who knows the circumstances of his 
appointment. 

Still, however, i'RU7'if > always unchangeable, and indeed al- 
most omnipotent, enables us to triumph over these well con- 
certed diplomatic manoeuvres. 

Mr. Pinkney was sent to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary with 
Mr. Munroe, in order to negotiate a Treaty. They effected 
the object of their mission, and in a manner so satisfactory, 
that they declared to Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Jefferson sta- 
ted to Congress, that " all the points in dispute were satis- 
factorily adjusted." 

The interest of France, however, forbad the ratification of this 
Treaty, and the pretended Friend of the People, Mr. Jef- 
ferson, ventured to do what Washington never did, nor would 
have dared to have done, he rejected this solemn and ad- 
vantageous Treaty on his own mere authority and opinion, 
without submitting it to the Senate. 

Mr. Pinkney's powers ceased on the signing this Treaty, and 
when Mr. Munroe left England, he remained there not as an 
accredited Minister, but a mere Charge des Affaires, or 
Agent for Mr, Munroe. It was then necessary to appoint a 
new Minister, or clothe Mr. Pinkney with powers. 

In February, 1808, Mr. Jefferson nominated him merely as a 
form, and General Bradley, and all the friends of the Pre- 
sident in the Senate were instructed, that the appointment 
was to be negatived, in order to relieve the President from 
the odium and responsibility of removing a man appointed by 
himself. 

General Bradley went so far as to move an inquiry into the 
manner in which he had executed his oftice, and obeyed 
his instructions, with a view to negative the nomination. 

In the interim, a letter was received from Mr. Pinkney, so 
fully supporting the views, the whims and destructive notions 
of the Cabinet, so replete with prejudice and abuse against 
Great Britain, that the President's friends shamelessly with- 
drew their objections and inquiries, without any avowed rea- 



18 

son, and assented to the appointment of a man whom they 
found quite suppliant enough, and sufficiently hostile to the 
Government to which he was agent, to be safely trusted. 
They knew that in such hands there was no danger of a good 
understanding or amicable settlement with Great Britain, 
which of all things they most dreaded. 

We have too high an opinion of Mr. Pinkney's talents to be- 
lieve these opinions to arise from any thing, but a desire to 
please his patrons. They were the expected returns for 
his public honours and emoluments. They were a necessary 
sacrifice for the reputation of his patrons. 

Will any man, acquainted with the state of Great Britain, be- 
lieve him when he tells us the Embargo is deeply felt in that 
country ; that their wheat crop had failed, or was alarming- 
ly &/iort ! Our mercantile men know better. We know 
that the Embargo produces no political effect in Great Bri- 
tain, but that the first operation was the most considerable. 
The anticipation was more serious than the reality, and eve- 
ry day while it lessens the effect, diminishes the apprehen- 
sion. In short, we should be obliged to let Mr. Pinkney 
down to a low niche in the scale of understanding, if we 
could not find a refuge for him in his desire to please his 
poiilical patrons. 



Extract of a private letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison. 

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 21, 1808. 

" THE Hope arrived at Cowes from France the 13th. Not 
having heard from Mr. Canning, although he returned to Lon- 
don the 16th, I called again yesterday at Downing Street, and 
was assured that the answer to my note would be sent to-night 
or early to-morrow morning. Mr. At water will of course be 
able to leave town on Friday, and embark on Saturday with a 
copy of it. 

44 I have been told since the arrival of the last British Packet, 
(but do not believe it,) that there is more probability than I 
had anticipated, that the late events in Spain and Portugal, 
(which ought not to be considered as deciding any thing,) will 
have an effect on public opinion in America against the conti- 
nuance of the Embargo, and favourable to all the purposes of 
Great Britain. If this were true, I should think it was deep- 
ly to be lamented. I may misunderstand the subject, but I 
cannot persuade myself that any thing that has happened on 
this side the Atlantic, ought to induce us in any degree to re- 
treat from our present system. If we should resolve to trade 
With Spain and Portugal, (Great Britain and France persisting 
their Orders and Decrees,) in any way to which Great Bri- 



19- 

tain would not object, we must suspend the Embargo as to 
those Countries only, or as to tbose Countries and Great Bri- 
tain, or we must repeal it altogether. The temptation to the 
first of these courses is, even in a commercial sense, inconsi- 
derable — the objection to it endless. The object to be gained 
(if no more was gained than ought to be gained) would be 
trifling. There could indeed be no gain. An inadequate mar- 
ket redundantly supplied, would be more injurious than no 
market at all — it would be a lure to destruction and nothing more. 
A suspension of the Embargo so limited in its nature as this 
would be, (supposing it could be in fact what it could be in 
form,) would have a most unequal and invidious operation in 
the different quarters of the Union, of which the various com- 
modities, would not in the ports of Portugal and Spain, be in 
equal demand. A war with France would be inevitable — 
and such a war, (so produced,) from which we could not hope 
to derive either honour or advantage, would place us at the 
mercy of Great Britain, and on that account would in the end 
do more to cripple and humble us, than any disaster that could 
otherwise befal us. The actual state of Spain and Portugal is 
moreover not to be relied upon. My first opinion on that sub- 
ject remains. But even the most sanguine Avill admit that 
there is great room to doubt. The Emperor of France is evi- 
dently collecting a mighty force for the reduction of Spain, and 
Portugal must share its fate. And even if that force should be 
destined (as some suppose) first to contend with Austria 
— the speedy subjugation of Spain is not the less certain. If 
France should succeed, Spain and Portugal would again fall 
under the British Orders of November, as well as under the 
operation of the French Decrees. Our cargoes would scarcely 
have found their way to the ocean in search of the boasted mar- 
ket, before they would be once more in a state of prohibition, 
and we should in the meantime have incurred the scandal of 
suffering an improvident thirst of gain to seduce us from our 
principles into a dilemma presenting no alternative but loss in 
all the senses of the word. 

" But it is not even certain, what Great Britain would herself 
finally say to such a partial suspension of the embargo. She 
would doubtless a.tjirsl approve of it. But her ultimate course 
(especially if war between France and the United States, were 
not the immediate consequence, or if the measure were even- 
tually less beneficial to herself, than might be supposed at the 
outset) ought not to be trusted. That she should approve at 
first, is hardly to be questioned, and the considerations upon 
which she would do so, are precisely those which should dis- 
suade us from it. Some of these are — .the aid it would afford 
to her allies, as well as to her own troops co-operating with 
them, and its consequent tendency to destroy every thing like 
system in our conduct — its tendency to embroil us with France,. 



20 

its tendency to induce us by overstocking a limited market, to 
make our commodities of no value — to dissipate our capital — 
to ruin our merchants without benefiting our agriculture — to 
destroy our infant manufactures without benefiting our com- 
merce — its tendency to habituate us to a trammelled trade, and 
to fit us for acquiescence in a maritime despotism. But there 
are other reasons — our trade with Spain and Portugal while it 
lasted, would be a circuitous one with Great Britain and her 
Colonies, for their benefit. Our productions would be carried 
in the first instance to Spain and Portugal, would be bought 
there for Biitish account, and would find their way to the West- 
Indies or enter here, as British convenience might require, and 
thus, in effect, the Embargo be removed as to Great Britain, 
while it continued as to Prance, and we professed to continue it 
as to both. And if any profits should arise from this sordid 
traffic, they would become a fund .to enable us to import into 
the United States, directly or indirectly, the manufactures of 
Great Britain, and thus relieve her in another way, while her 
Orders would prevent us from receiving the commodities of her 
enemy. It would be far better openly to take off the Embargo 
as to Great Britain, than Avhile affecting to continue it as to 
that power, to do what must rescue her completely (and that 
too, without advantage to ourselves) from the pressure of it, at 
the same time that it would promote her views against Prance, 
in Portugal and Spain. 

As to withdrawing the embargo as to Great Britain, as well 
as Spain and Portugal, while the British orders are unrepealed, 
the objections to that course are just as strong now as they were 
four months ago. The change in Spain and Portugal (if it were 
even likely to last) cannot touch the principle of the Embargo, 
as regards Great Britain, who reasserts her Orders of November, 
in the very explanations of the 4th July, under which we must 
trade with those countries, if we trade with them at all. If we 
include Great Britain in the suspension and exclude Prance, we 
do now what we have declined to do before, for the sake of a de- 
lusive commerce, which may perish before it can be enjoyed, 
and cannot in any event be enjoyed with credit, wnh advantage, 
or even with safety. We take part at once with Great Britain 
against France, at a time the least suited that could be imagined 
to such a determination, at a time when it might be said we 
were emboldened by French reverses, to do what before we 
could not resolve upon, or even tempted by a prospect of a scan- 
ty profit, exaggerated by our cupidity and impatience to forget 
what was due to consistency, to character and permanent pros- 
perity. We sanction too the maritime pretensions which insult 
and injure us; we throw ourselves bound hand and foot upon 
the generosity of a Government that has hitherto refused us jus- 
tice, and all this when the affair of the Chesupcake, and a host 
of other wrongs are unredressed, and when Great Britain has 



21 

just rejected an overture which she must have accepted with ea- 
gerness if, her views were not such as it became us to suspect 
and guard against. To repeal the Embargo altogether would be 
preferable to either of the other courses, but wouid notwith- 
standing be so fatal to us in all respects, that we should long feel 
the wound it would inflict, unless indeed some other expedient,* 
as strong at least and as efficacious in all its bearings, can (as I 
fear it cannot) be substituted in its place. War would seem to 
be the unavoidable result of such a step. If our commerce 
should not flourish in consequence of this measure, nothing 
would be gained by it but dishonour. And how it could be car- 
ried on to any valuable purpose it Avould be difficult to shew. If 
our commerce should flourish in spite of trench and British 
edicts, and the miserable state of the world, in spite of war with 
France, if that should happen, it would I doubt not, be assailed in 
some other form. The spirit of monopoly has seized the Peo- 
ple and Government of this country. We shall not under any 
circumstances be tolerated as rivals in navigation and trade — it is 
in vain to hope that Great Britain will voluntarily foster the naval 
means of the United States. All her prejudices — all her calcu- 
lations are against it. Even as allies we should be subjects of 
jealousy. It would be endless to enumerate in detail the evils 
which would cling to us in this new career of vassalage and 
meanness, and tedious to pursue our backward course to the ex- 
tinction of that very trade to which we had sacrificed every thing 
else. 

" On the other hand if we persevere we must gain our pur- 
pose at last. By complying with the little policy of the mo- 
ment, we shall be lost. By a great and systematic adherence to 
principle, we shall find the end to our difficulties. The Embar- 
go and the loss of our trade are deeply felt here, and will be 
felt with more severity every day — The wheal] harvest is likely 
to be alarmingly short, and the state of the Continent will aug- 
ment the evil. The discontents among their manufacturers 
are only quieted for the moment by temporary causes. Cotton 
is rising and soon will be scarce. Unfavourable events on the 
Continent will subdue the temper unfriendly to wisdom andjus- 



* "This strong measure, equally efficacious, is the present Non- 
" Intercourse, proposed by Mr. Giles. We see how exactly the ad- 
" vice of this supple minister has been followed. We refused to aid 
" Spain and Portugal by taking off the Embargo as to them, and we 
" now adopt his recammendation of a strong substitute." 

f That the public may judge of Mr. Pinkney's correctness and preju- 
dices, we would observe that flour or wheat does not exceed its average 
price in time of war in Great Britain. The truth is, this letter, if not 
written here and sent out to be signed by Mr. Pinkney, was designed 
to forward the views of the President, as to keeping on the Embargo. 



22 

tice, which now prevails here. But above all, the world will I 
trust be convinced that our firmness is not to be shaken. Our 
measures have not been without effect. 1'hey have not been 
decisive, because we have not been thought capable of perseve- 
ring in self-denial, if that can be called self-denial, which is no 
more than prudent abstinence from destruction and dishonour. 

" I ought to mention that I have been told by a most respect- 
able American merchant here, that large quantities of such 
woollen cloths as are prohibited by our non-importion act, have 
been and continue to be sent to Canada, with the view of being 
smuggled into the United States. 

" I need not tell you that I am induced to trouble you with my 
hasty reflections, because I think you stand in need of them. I 
give them merely because I believe that you are entitled to know 
the impressions which a public servant on this side of the water 
receives from a view of our situation. I have the honour to be 
with the sincerest attachment and respect, dear sir, your obe- 
dient servant. (Signed) WILLIAM PINKNEY." 



REFLECTIONS 



OjY THE FOREGOING INTERESTING STATE PAPERS, 



THE importance and interest of the foregoing- Documents 
are too obvious to require very elaborate remarks ; but it may- 
be useful to state briefly the inferences which irresistibly pre- 
sent themselves upon reading them. 

The first idea, which we cannot keep back even with the 
most charitable feelings, is the unparalleled duplicity and hy- 
pocrisy manifested by our Government in pretending to give 
the People the true state of their diplomatic intercourse with 
foreign nations, while facts vastly more important than any 
heretofore published, were knowingly suppressed. 

This duplicity is enhanced beyond belief, by the knowledge 
that while the Government pretended to give some Documents 
as professed extracts, and others as whole and entire letters, 
these latter were in fact as mutilated as the former, and we are 
now enabled to give the public whole pages which are to be in- 
serted in letters heretofore published as pe\fectly complete. 

2dly. That while the Government have been passing reso- 
lutions, and adopting or rather proposing measures leading to 
War, while they have called upon the people to su/i/iort them 
in these most serious measures, and while they have deluded 
a small part of the citizens into expressions of approbation, and 
into declarations that both the belligerents have given us equal 
cause of complaint, it turns out that the most interesting facts, 
the most insulting and injurious conduct of the Emperor of 
France, have been suppressed, and the most pacific expres- 
sions and friendly explanations of Great Britain have been with- 
held — with what views let the public decide. 

3dly. That Gen. Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, advised, 
and long ago expected measures of resistance and hostility to 
France — that he declared, that we were considered a wordy 
and windy nation, which did not dare proceed beyond resolu- 
tions, and that our Embargo was wholly ineffectual as to its ob- 
jects. 

Lastly. It is apparent, that if our people have been so roused, 
so convinced of the partiality and hypocrisy of the Administra- 
tion in consequence of the glimmering of light which was per- 
mitted to escape through the mutilated dispatches before pub- 



24 

lished, through the speeches of our patriotic members of Con- 
gress, and the commentaries upon the public Documents here- 
tofore given to the public, their indignation could hardly have 
been restrained, if this whole irresistible torrent of light had 
been at once darted forth upon their astonished and affrighted 
minds. 

In addition to the evidence thus reluctantly extorted and 
finally obtained without the consent of the Administration, of 
their devotion to France, the whole correspondence proves be- 
yond a question, that Mr. Armstrong was never in the con- 
fidence of Mr. Jefferson — that he never entered into his views 
perfectly, and that the real intercourse has been carried on 
either through Monsieur Turreau, or some private confidential 
agent. The sending out Mr. Coles, the President's private 
Secretary, is very strong corroborative evidence of what the 
Documents themselves would lead us almost necessarily to 
presume. 

One single reflection will occur to every thinking and consi- 
derate man, that if our exertions to resist the corrupt and de- 
structive course of Administration were heretofore thought ne- 
cessary, the present documents prove them to be doubly im- 
portant. If those exertions have been heretofore crowned with 
signal success, we ought not to doubt that our reward will in 
future be not less abundant or satisfactory. 



FLATBUSH, (^V. Y.) 
PRINTED MARCH 4, 1809. 



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